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-2Abstract
State Attorneys General have emerged as influential political actors on the
national level in the last 25 years. State attorneys general seek to influence policy at the
federal level in both partisan and bipartisan manners. Media attention in recent years
and previous scholarship has focused mostly on areas of partisan conflict between and
among state attorneys general. This paper seeks to explore areas of bipartisan
cooperation among state attorneys general as demonstrated through the practice of
signing multistate advocacy letters addressed to Congress, administrative agencies,
and the private sector that are coordinated through the efforts of the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG. The intention of this thesis is to analyze the
mean percentage of signatures by state attorneys general on NAAG multistate letters
from 2009 to 2020 in order to identify trends that can shed light on the practice of
signing multistate advocacy letters and whether partisan political considerations have
impacted the practice. 3 research questions, corresponding to independent variables,
seek to evaluate whether there are statistically significant differences between political
parties, elected or appointed AGs, and those running for office or not in the practice of
signing NAAG multistate advocacy letters.
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-4INTRODUCTION
State attorneys general increasingly influence politics and policy at the national
level, through both partisan conflict and bipartisan cooperation. Previous research on
state attorneys general and their attempts at influence has focused on instances of
partisan conflict—a notable example being a lawsuit filed by Texas Attorney General
Ken Paxton in December 2020 seeking to invalidate election results in other states.
Flying under the radar at the same time, though, was a bipartisan advocacy letter sent
to Congress by state attorneys general seeking to encourage passage of legislation
protecting federal judges and their families— “Daniel’s Law.”1 This thesis seeks to
evaluate the practice of state attorneys general signing bipartisan advocacy letters
during the heightened partisan tensions of the Obama and Trump administrations. First
though, vital context and background information on an elected office once occupied at
various times by former President Bill Clinton, former Vice President Walter Mondale,
and incumbent Vice President Kamala Harris.
The office of state attorney general accords significant authority to an often
elected, otherwise appointed, partisan politician. State attorneys general are considered
by some political scientists to rival state governors in power, as state attorneys general
face fewer normative constraints and limits to advocacy.2 While powers and
responsibilities vary by jurisdiction, the state attorney general is nominally the chief legal
officer of each state or territory’s government. Nationally, there are 56 attorneys
general, including the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories—American
Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands. State
attorneys general represent the interests and citizens of their state or territory in court,

-5provide written counsel and guidance to regulatory and administrative bodies of their
state or territory, and act as public advocates in specialized issue areas—consumer
protection, antitrust, utility regulation, etc.3
As then-Delaware Senator Joe Biden once stated, “When the attorneys general
signed on, people started to pay a lot more attention.” 4 In addition to performing their
duties within their state or territory’s borders, state attorneys general in the 21 st century
have increasingly sought to influence public policy at the national level and articulate
their political positions. Though considered “the people’s lawyer” and possessing other
nominally apolitical responsibilities, state attorneys general in the 21 st century have
become increasingly political actors. Previously, “It just wasn’t an office that garnered
that type of limelight.” 5 The 2018 elections demonstrated the increased political
salience of state attorneys general, both in terms of money collected from donors and
widespread competition in state attorney general races. 2018 was the first election in
which state attorneys general associations—DAGA and RAGA, detailed further later in
the paper—threw off the gloves and actively targeted incumbents of the opposing
party.6 Prior norms had led to an informal agreement to not invest significant amounts
opposing longtime incumbents. The public breaking of the truce in 2017 marked a
highwater moment in the increasing partisan tensions among state attorneys general,
which derived from political activism and influence attempts beyond their borders.
As political actors, state attorneys general have the potential to generate both
conflict and cooperation through their influence efforts, generating an uneasy tension
over the years. Partisan political efforts have in recent years overshadowed the areas of
bipartisan cooperation among state attorneys general that fulfill their stated mission to
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shepherd bipartisan cooperation is the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG).
One method through which state attorneys general attempt to influence the
national agenda in a bipartisan manner is through multistate advocacy letters issued by
the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). While previous research has
focused on multistate litigation among state attorneys general, little work has been
conducted on so-called “soft power” tools in the state attorney general’s arsenal, most
notably NAAG multistate policy advocacy letters.
As signing NAAG multistate advocacy letters is not a constitutional responsibility
for attorneys general and therefore discretionary, the letters provide an opportunity to
examine the extent of political activity among state attorneys general over time. NAAG
multistate letters purport to endure as an example of bipartisan cooperation in the public
interest among state attorneys general who increasingly exploit their positions for
partisan political activism. The intention of this thesis is to analyze the mean percentage
of signatures by state attorneys general on NAAG multistate letters from 2009 to 2020
in order to identify trends that can shed light on the practice of signing multistate
advocacy letters and whether partisan political considerations have impacted the
practice. Through three independent variables—political party identification, method of
selection for the office, and whether the officeholder is running for office, re-election or
otherwise—I will compute mean percentages of signatures for state attorneys general
yearly from 2009 to 2020, and determine if any statistically significant differences
emerge that can shed light on state attorneys general and whether the practice of
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in the public interest.
Before conducting my analysis, a review of the literature follows that seeks to
place the increase in political activity by state attorneys general in historical context,
from the late 20th century to the Obama and Trump administrations, where state
attorneys general have become “entrenched as integral policymaking actors in the
United States.” 7 After a discussion of the heightened trends in political activity and
partisanship by state attorneys general, I will touch on areas of policymaking in which
norms of bipartisan cooperation among state attorneys general have prevailed.
Following the literature review will be a methodology section transitioning into the
analysis, proceeded by discussion of results and conclusion.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Initial Political Activism By State Attorneys General
State attorney general political activism correlates closely with trends in
American federalism in the 20th century. As noted expert on state attorneys general
Paul Nolette writes, “the cooperative federalism of the 1960s gave way to the coercive
federalism of the 1970s and beyond…” .8 The increase in top-down federal regulatory
dictates—unfunded mandates, preemption, etc.—fueled increased partisan polarization
at the federal level, and led to state policymakers identifying closer with federal
policymakers ideologically. Amidst this, activist state attorneys general saw opportunity
to challenge federal policy directly, starting during the Reagan administration.9 Amidst
what one scholar labels the era of “New Federalism” where traditionally federal
responsibilities began devolving to the states, state attorneys general evolved from

-8independent, state-focused actors to collaborative, interstate activists seeking to shape
federal policy towards their interpretation of the public’s interest.10 Beginning to stake
out roles as federal policy influencers in the 1980s laid the groundwork for what would
become a watershed moment for state attorneys general: targeting the tobacco industry
in the late 1990s.
Targeting Big Tobacco
Starting in 1994, state attorneys general individually filed lawsuits against major
tobacco companies, seeking to redress the public health damages to citizens in their
states that the companies were known to be aware of and had long neglected. When
Mississippi’s Michael Moore filed the first tobacco lawsuit in 1994, it was seen as
unconventional, and “more than a way to recover the state’s health expenses.”

11

The

state attorneys general saw an opportunity to step in and regulate through litigation an
industry not operating in the public interest that the federal government was not being
aggressive enough towards. State attorneys general were capitalizing on their
successful, yet isolated, influence efforts in the 1980s, and pushing the office of state
attorney general to the forefront of the national agenda as policymaking actors. As more
state attorneys general filed lawsuits, “lines of stress were increasingly obvious as the
far-flung attorneys general staked out their positions,” 12 and the need for collaboration
became evident. Collaborative efforts, spearheaded by Vermont’s James Tierney and
NAAG, resulted in the largest civil litigation settlement in American history in 1998, the
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. While the settlement cemented state attorneys
general as actors at the national level, dissent from some attorneys general in the
tobacco lawsuits portended growing partisan polarization among state attorneys
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clouded by and tinged with partisan polarization that has gradually increased during the
21st century, and is arguably at an all-time high currently.
RAGA, DAGA, and Partisanship
During the tobacco litigation, Alabama Attorney General William Pryor emerged
as the most vocal dissenter, arguing that state attorneys general were overreaching and
acting where legislative power would be more appropriate. “What we’re talking about is
a political problem, not a legal problem,” said Pryor.13 Frustration among Republican
attorneys general, including Pryor, about perceived partisan overreaches by Democratic
attorneys general targeting business interests—many of whom were donors to
Republican attorneys general—led to the founding of the Republican Attorneys General
Association (RAGA)—a federal political action committee— in 1999. Upon founding
RAGA and serving as its first treasurer, Pryor stated “Hopefully it (RAGA) will help elect
more conservative and free market-oriented attorneys general.”14 Democratic attorneys
general responded by founding the Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA)
in 2002. DAGA began as a part-time political action committee and paled in comparison
financially and influence to RAGA throughout much of the 2000s.15 RAGA drew on the
strength of its donors—most significantly corporate business interests—and began
raising vast amounts of money to influence state attorney general elections nationwide
during the 2000s, most notably during the presidency of Barack Obama. In an
increasingly polarized political environment, indifference to the partisan identity of the
attorney general no longer applied. “The stakes are too high for us to leave winnable
races on the table,” a former RAGA Executive Director stated.16

- 10 RAGA’s electoral success led to Democratic attorneys general—who had long
held a majority of state attorney general seats nationwide—losing their majority in 2012,
and Republicans holding a majority of state attorney general positions by 2015.17 In the
words of one former attorney general, “Over time, it (RAGA) has gone from being an
ideological entity and has become more of an extension of the Chamber of Commerce.”
18

The electoral success of Republican attorneys general increasingly led them to assert

themselves at the national level via multistate lawsuits during the Obama presidency, a
period that set a precedent for antagonism between presidents and attorneys general of
the opposing party.
State Attorney General Partisanship During The Obama Presidency
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) established that
state attorneys general have “special solicitude” when suing the federal government,
setting formal precedent for state attorneys general to sue the federal government in
attempts to influence policy.19 60 multistate lawsuits, led by Republican attorneys
general, were brought against the Obama administration over his two terms, a number
which doubled from the first to the second term.20 According to Paul Nolette, “in
Obama’s second term, the scope of AG conflict expanded rapidly.” 21 Not only were
more multistate lawsuits filed by state attorneys general against the Obama
administration than any previous, but the policies targeted by the lawsuits were more
broad than previous lawsuits. These lawsuits reflected “a new willingness on the part of
conservative AGs to challenge a breadth of federal policies…” .22 Thus, the Obama
administration was a significant period in which state attorneys general expanded their
powers through filing more multistate lawsuits that reflected acute partisan divisions,
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the activism of state attorneys general during the Obama administration, Democrats
reciprocated during the Trump administration to a similar, if not greater, degree.
State Attorney General Partisanship During The Trump Presidency
Democratic state attorneys general imitated the tactics of their Republican
colleagues during the Trump administration, filing in 2017 alone over 50 percent more
lawsuits against the administration than were filed in total against either the Bush 43 or
Obama administrations.23 Democratic state attorneys general anticipated some of the
controversial policies of the Trump administration—on immigration and the environment,
for example— and quickly filed lawsuits challenging them. Describing the practice of
filing legal challenges to Trump administration policies, California attorney general
Xavier Becerra notably stated, “I see it as a team sport.”24 Indeed, the position of state
attorney general has evolved into what one scholar describes as “a veto point frustrating
administration policies.”25 As former Vermont attorney general James Tierney has said,
“…whether it’s suing the president or not suing the president, that’s huge, and so that’s
what attracts the media attention.”26 “Fighting the feds” has politicized an office some
once derided as the “state dogcatcher.”27 The increase in partisan political activism by
state attorneys general during the Obama and Trump presidencies, however,
overshadows the areas of bipartisan cooperation among state attorneys general that
have endured.
Areas of Bipartisan Cooperation Among Attorneys General
Areas of state attorney general bipartisan cooperation when attempting to
influence federal policy have focused on criminal law enforcement and consumer
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occurring in multiple states, Democratic and Republican state attorneys general have
frequently filed similar amicus briefs in federal court in many significant criminal cases
with constitutional implications. During the late Obama and early Trump administrations,
state attorneys general nationwide collaborated on suing pharmaceutical manufacturers
and distributors in an effort to address the opioid overdose epidemic.28 Shortly after
President Trump took office, a bipartisan coalition of state attorneys general filed suit in
federal court against a major for-profit college accreditor, seeking to hold the accreditor
responsible for the abuses of the for-profit college industry. As Nolette writes, “the
timing wasn’t coincidental,” and an education policy expert stated “the intervention (
lawsuit) serves as a form of insurance.” 29 The state attorneys general here were
cooperating to insulate what they perceived as a vital criminal investigation from political
influence. These examples of state attorneys general cooperating on a bipartisan basis
to influence federal policy stand in contrast to the escalated partisan tensions present
among state attorneys general during the Obama and Trump presidencies. Alongside
these bipartisan criminal investigations and multistate lawsuits, state attorneys general
“have learned to rely on “soft power” tools, jointly authored letters addressed particularly
to members of Congress and to federal agencies.”30
NAAG Multistate Letters and “Soft Power”
Using “soft power”—in the form of signing NAAG Multistate Letters—to influence
federal policy through Congress and the administrative agencies, “reflects the expanded
power and policy networks” of state attorneys general.31 State attorneys general have
used their “soft power” to elevate policy areas they feel the federal government needs to
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support or dissent for federal legislation and policy,” and “communicate
recommendations or requests to industry groups or companies.” 33 Thirty-six of the 56
state attorneys general must sign the advocacy letter for it to be adopted, and the
organization only issues letters with bipartisan support. The practice of signing NAAG
multistate letters began in 2006, at a time of less partisan activity and division among
state attorneys general. The majority of NAAG multistate letters are written to
congressional committees and congressional leadership, with a smaller portion written
to administrative agencies, such as the FCC, and a select few written to influential
private sector actors, such as Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg.
Previous research on state attorneys general has focused on the evolution of the
role and increased partisan political activism among state attorneys general. The aim of
this thesis is to analyze NAAG multistate advocacy letters, purportedly a bastion of
bipartisanship that has endured amid the increase in partisan activity during the Obama
and Trump administrations. The following section details the methodology for my
analysis of NAAG multistate advocacy letters, detailing the independent and dependent
variables, research questions, hypotheses, and statistical analysis methods used.
METHODOLOGY
To conduct research on the number of NAAG Multistate Letters signed by state
attorneys general, I began with the NAAG website, with its database of letters archived
by year.34 After reading each letter briefly, I tracked which state attorneys general had
signed on to the letter, and collected the information in an Excel spreadsheet for the
years 2009 to 2020. Three questions directed my research; each focused on a different
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percentage of signatures from 2009 to 2020. Percentages were used in lieu of discrete
numbers of signatures, as the number of signatures varied year-to-year from a low of 1
to a high of 14. What follows is a brief explanation of each independent variable, why it
was used, and its implications.
Political Party Identification
My initial research began with asking the question of whether there are
statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of signatures on NAAG
multistate advocacy letters between Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. As
NAAG multistate letters are intended to be bipartisan in nature, significant disparities in
the composition of signatures on an advocacy letter could indicate departures from
bipartisanship. As the party holding the majority of state attorney general positions
shifted from a longstanding Democratic advantage to parity followed soon by a
Republican majority 35, such shifts could have had implications for the practice of
signing NAAG multistate advocacy letters. Evaluating whether Democrats signed more
NAAG multistate letters during their time in the majority and fewer during Republican
majority, for example, could provide an additional opportunity to evaluate the impact of
political party identification on the practice of signing NAAG multistate advocacy letters.
The small number of Independents, mostly from the territories, likely will merely provide
context, given their numerical disparity.

Question 1: Are there statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of
NAAG multistate letters signed by Democratic, Republican, and Independent state
attorneys general from 2009 to 2020?
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multistate letters signed by Democratic, Republican, and Independent state attorneys
general from 2009 to 2020.
H1: Democratic state attorneys general signed a higher mean percentage of NAAG
multistate letters than Republican and Independent state attorneys general from 2009 to
2020.

Method of Selection for Office
State attorneys general are either elected or appointed, with the majority being
elected. In 43 states, the attorney general is popularly elected. Attorneys general are
appointed by the governor in five states: Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
and Wyoming. The state legislature in Maine appoints the attorney general, and the
Tennessee Supreme Court appoints the Tennessee Attorney General.36 Elected
attorneys general must be politically active within their state, and being politically active
outside the state—through conflict or cooperation— often helps raise their profiles in the
minds of voters. State attorney general elections, relative to gubernatorial races and
other statewide races, “tend to not be high profile.” 37 While partisanship and political
activism are generally how state attorneys general raise their electoral profile, a
bipartisan record via signing NAAG multistate letters could have electoral implications
as well.
A common colloquialism in state-level politics holds that “A.G.” stands for
“aspiring governor.” In his paper “When Is A.G. Short for Aspiring Governor?”, Provost
states that attorneys general running for election “display inherently different levels of
ambition.” 38 Provost further postulates that “the degree to which AGs are able to be
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exploit the political environment.”39 Elected attorneys general have greater incentive
than appointed attorneys general to value constituent needs, which could influence the
policy areas they attempt to influence. An attorney general that is elected is “more likely
to shade their positions closer to the public view.”40
In contrast, as a result of not needing to campaign and being less directly
responsible to constituent needs, appointed attorneys general have more latitude in the
policy areas they seek to influence. “Appointed attorneys general…are freer generally in
the expression of opinions on controversial issues…distinct from the growing fear that if
this is done it may cost votes.”41 The practice of signing NAAG multistate letters and the
cooperation it purports to reflect could yield a significant difference for elected and
appointed attorneys general. Elected attorneys general may sign more NAAG multistate
letters as a way of building a bipartisan record that could come in handy in the next
election.
Question 2: Is there a statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of
NAAG multistate letters signed by appointed and elected state attorneys general from
2009 to 2020?
H0: There is no statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of NAAG
multistate letters signed by appointed and elected state attorneys general from 2009 to
2020.
H2: Elected state attorneys general signed a higher mean percentage of NAAG
multistate letters than appointed state attorneys general from 2009 to 2020.

Actively Running for Office or Not
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re-election or a higher office may influence the practice of signing NAAG multistate
advocacy letters. Practically speaking, state attorneys general running for office while
holding office likely will have less available time to read and sign NAAG multistate
advocacy letters. In “When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor?”, Provost draws on
literature on “progressive ambition” to yield insights about state attorneys general and
their electoral ambition. As state attorneys general “have already climbed to a high level
in state government, it is plausible to argue that they all have high levels of progressive
ambition.”42 While not every state attorney general runs for higher office, let alone reelection, similar to the discrepancy between elected and appointed attorneys general
there could be electoral implications to signing NAAG multistate letters and appearing to
bolster one’s bipartisan policy record ahead of an election.
A key assumption underlying the final two independent variables—method of
selection for office, and whether the officeholder is running for office or not—is that
activity intended to bolster one’s bipartisan record, signing NAAG multistate letters in
this case, yields electoral benefits. Most of the literature on the impact of electoral
incentives approaches the topic from the viewpoint of House of Representatives
members.43 Unfortunately, literature on electoral implications of bipartisanship for state
attorneys general is sparse. Through the final two independent variables, this paper
seeks to hopefully provide some insight into electoral incentives.

Question 3: Is there a statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of
NAAG multistate letters signed by state attorneys general running for office and those
not running for office from 2009 to 2020?
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multistate letters signed by state attorneys general running for office and those not
running for office from 2009 to 2020.
H3: State attorneys general not running for office signed a higher mean percentage of
NAAG multistate letters than state attorneys general not running for office from 2009 to
2020.

Data Collection
This section will detail my data collection through an example process, which
subsequently was iterated through each NAAG multistate letter issued from 2009 to
2020. Following the example, I will discuss limitations in the data and where
adjustments were made. As stated previously, my starting point was NAAG’s website
dedicated to their policy letter archive.44 Each letter—accessible as a PDF—contains a
similar heading section, with the different recipients specified in the opening. The
attorneys general on the left side lead the Executive Committee for NAAG, membership
of which rotates on a yearly basis.
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The majority of NAAG multistate letters are addressed to Congress, with slightly
more letters sent to particular congressional committees with the capacity to act on the
desired policy action being advocated for. While many NAAG letters are addressed to
congressional committees and include the majority and minority leaders in each house,
other letters are addressed only to the majority and minority leaders, as the subject of
the letter may be beyond the scope of a committee. For example, a NAAG letter in
October 2020 concerned the CARES Act and fiscal relief for multiple industries, and
was addressed to the majority and minority leaders specifically.
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The body section of NAAG multistate letters details the policy being advocated
for and marshals supporting evidence, often citing judicial cases and previous acts of
legislation. For intellectual property protection purposes, I have not included an image of
the body of a NAAG letter, but the letters generally do not exceed more than five pages
in total. The signature sections of each letter contain the empirical data that I have used
in conducting my research. Either the attorney general signed the letter or they did not;
there are no partial signatures. The signatures are a lifted image on file at NAAG of the
attorney general’s official signature. Often, the signatures of the attorneys general
taking an active role and interest in the policy area are listed first—referred to as the
“lead states”— followed by an alphabetical listing of those who have signed onto the
letter.
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During my review of each letter from 2009 to 2020, I had an Excel spreadsheet
open in a separate window to record an “R” or “D” where each attorney general from
each state had signed a letter. Every attorney general’s name, party affiliation, method
of selection for the office, and whether they were running for office that year were
included as well.
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Some intricacies in the data emerged and merit notice briefly, yet did not impact
the data collection significantly. An infrequent occurrence was an attorney general
vacating the office at some point during that year and an acting attorney general filling
the vacancy. California Attorney General and future Vice President Kamala Harris, for
example, was re-elected as attorney general in 2014 to a four-year term. She ran
successfully for U.S. Senate in 2016, vacating the office of attorney general mid-term in
January 2017. Her replacement, Xavier Becerra, though appointed by the Governor,
was still considered elected for my data collection, as the office of attorney general was
still on the ballot in 2018 and Mr. Becerra’s appointment was an unusual circumstance.
In other instances where an attorney general vacated office at a point during the year,
the officeholder—either the attorney general or their replacement—who held the
position for more days in the year was used in my data collection. The Attorney General
for the District of Columbia was an appointed position until 2014, when it was first
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one datum, it is worth noting.
Upon finishing data collection, I computed mean percentages of signatures on
NAAG multistate letters for single years alongside the raw total of signatures in a year.
As the number of letters issued per year varied, I viewed percentages as a way of
standardizing the data. 2015 and 2016 were outliers, as significantly fewer letters were
available to sign during those two years before a rebound in 2017. In presenting my
data as follows, I will proceed in order of the independent variables: political party
identification, method of selection for office, and whether the officeholder was running
for office. The first visual presentation will be a line graph showing the change in mean
percentages of signatures on NAAG letters over the period from 2009 to 2020.
Following brief discussion of these results, I will present the results of significance
testing, again followed by brief discussion.
ANALYSIS
Question 1: Are there statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of
NAAG multistate letters signed by Democratic, Republican, and Independent state
attorneys general from 2009 to 2020?
H0: There are no statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of NAAG
multistate letters signed by Democratic, Republican, and Independent state attorneys
general from 2009 to 2020.
H1: Independent state attorneys general signed a lower mean percentage of NAAG
multistate letters than Democratic and Republican state attorneys general from 2009 to
2020.
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- 25 From 2009 to 2020, Democratic state attorneys general on average signed more
NAAG multistate policy advocacy letters than Republicans and Independents. A
significance analysis using ANOVA indicated a statistical significant difference was
present for this data set. Subsequent paired t-tests were conducted as well on the
individual variables. Of the three paired two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variances,
Democrats and Independents as well as Republicans and Independents showed
statistically significant differences. Democrats and Republicans produced a one-tail p
value of 0.05486, close to indicating statistically significance, but not quite.45 The null
hypothesis can be rejected here, though.
The clearest conclusion to be drawn is that Independents sign a significantly
lower mean percentage of NAAG multistate letters than their Democratic and
Republican colleagues. This was a likely conclusion to be drawn from the sheer
disparity between the number of Independent state attorneys general and partisan
identifying state attorneys general. Also contributing could be geographic disparity, in
that Independent state attorneys general overwhelmingly reside in western states and
territories. Raw statistics showed territorial attorneys general in particular signing fewer
advocacy letters. As these territories—Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Northern Mariana
Islands, United States Virgin Islands, Guam—do not have voting representation in
Congress, signing onto advocacy letters could be viewed as futile.

Question 2: Is there a statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of
NAAG multistate letters signed by appointed and elected state attorneys general from
2009 to 2020?

- 26 H0: There is no statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of NAAG
multistate letters signed by appointed and elected state attorneys general from 2009 to
2020.
H2: Elected state attorneys general signed a higher mean percentage of NAAG
multistate letters than appointed state attorneys general from 2009 to 2020.
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*P-value<0.05
From 2009 to 2020, there is a statistically significant difference between elected
and appointed state attorneys general, as elected attorneys general signed a higher
mean percentage of NAAG multistate advocacy letters than their appointed colleagues.
As before, this could be explained by the disparate majority of elected attorneys general
compared to their appointed colleagues. We can reject the null hypothesis in this case,
but would need more supporting evidence to validate the experimental hypothesis that
elected attorneys general sign more NAAG multistate advocacy letters than appointed
attorneys general.
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Question 3: Is there a statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of
NAAG multistate letters signed by state attorneys general running for office and those
not running for office from 2009 to 2020?
H0: There is no statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of NAAG
multistate letters signed by state attorneys general running for office and those not
running for office from 2009 to 2020.
H3: State attorneys general not running for office signed a higher mean percentage of
NAAG multistate letters than state attorneys general not running for office from 2009 to
2020.
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*P-value<0.05
From 2009 to 2020, with the exceptions of 2009, 2013 and 2017—no incumbent
state attorneys general ran for office during those years—there was not a statistically
significant difference in the mean percentage of NAAG multistate advocacy letters
signed between attorneys general running for office and those not running for office. As
detailed in a previous section of the paper, this independent variable sought to evince
whether electoral incentives—the desire to appear to cooperate in a bipartisan manner
to voters—influence attorneys general and the practice of signing NAAG multistate
advocacy letters. While some individual attorneys general running for office appeared to
sign more advocacy letters, the aggregate did not show statistically significant
difference. As such, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for this independent variable.

- 30 CONCLUSION
During the 21st century, state attorneys general have increasingly attempted to
influence policy beyond their immediate jurisdictions, resulting in both cooperation and
conflict among state attorneys general. As much has been made of the conflicts
between state attorneys general as a symptom of increased partisan polarization,
comparatively little work has focused on aspects of bipartisan cooperation between
state attorneys general. Multistate advocacy letters issued through the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) seek to outline a desired policy or policy
change—often addressed to Congress and regulatory agencies—and are signed by
individual attorneys general.
This thesis sought to identify whether there are statistically significant differences
in the mean percentage of NAAG multistate advocacy letters issued during the Obama
and Trump administrations (2009-2020)—two administrations colored by partisan
polarization—through three independent variables: political party identification, method
of selection for the office, and whether the officeholder is running for office. The analysis
conducted utilized NAAG’s database of advocacy letters, and extrapolated statistics on
the number of signatures on the letters into an Excel spreadsheet. Once a range of
mean percentages of signatures was calculated, t-tests of statistical significance and an
ANOVA were performed using a significance level of p<.05.
For Q1, asking whether there were statistically significant differences between
Republican, Democratic, and Independent attorneys general in the mean percentage of
NAAG multistate advocacy letters signed, the ANOVA performed came close to
indicating statistical significance. Follow-up paired t-tests, though, showed a statistically

- 31 significant difference when the mean percentages of Independents were one of the
pairs. For Q2, asking whether there was a statistically significant difference between
elected and appointed state attorneys general in the mean percentage of NAAG
multistate advocacy letters signed, the t-test demonstrated a statistically significant
difference between elected and appointed state attorneys general. Elected attorneys
general signed a significantly higher mean percentage than appointed attorneys
general. Lastly, for Q3—asking whether there was a statistically significant difference
between attorneys general running for office and those not running with respect to the
mean percentages of NAAG multistate advocacy letters signed—there was not a
statistically significant difference.
This thesis lends credence to the claim that attorneys general who identify as
Independent sign a statistically significant lower percentage of NAAG multistate
advocacy letters, while Democrats and Republicans differ, but not to a statistically
significant degree. Sample size disparities cast some doubt on these claims, as there
are fewer Independent attorneys general than Democrats and Republicans cumulatively
in the population. A similar effect, though to a lesser extent, can be imputed to the
second claim: that elected attorneys general sign a higher mean percentage of NAAG
multistate advocacy letters than their appointed counterparts. The effect of these
sample size disparities could be reduced by regression if replicated in the future. The
third independent variable—whether the officeholder was running for office or not—
produced more equitable samples, but could be further refined to delineate between reelection and other races.

- 32 While it is too early to evaluate policy influence efforts by state attorneys general
in the Biden administration, it is reasonable to envision Republican attorneys general
increasingly challenging the administration, mirroring their Democratic colleagues during
the Trump administration.46 With no clear, parsimonious path out of heightened partisan
polarization in U.S. politics—at all levels of government—it is likely that political
incentives produced by conflict among state attorneys general will outweigh any
incentives of bipartisan cooperation, such as NAAG multistate advocacy letters. The
role of state attorney general will likely continue to attract more ambitious politicians
who recognize the potential efficacy afforded the position as a means of advancement.
No longer the “state dogcatcher” the state attorney general has been positioned as a
underappreciated, yet influential office, and will present opportunities for further
research and scholarship in the future.

- 33 Notes
1. See www.naag.org/policy-letter/supports-daniels-law/ for details.
2. (Provost, 2009)
3. (National Association of Attorneys General, 2020)
4. Ibid
5. (Bennett, 2018)
6. Ibid
7. (Nolette, The Dual Role of State Attorneys General in American Federalism:
Conflict and Cooperation in an Era of Partisan Polarization, 2017, p. 345)
8. (Nolette & Provost, Change and Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys General
in the Obama and Trump Administrations, 2018, p. 472)
9. (Nolette & Provost, Change and Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys General
in the Obama and Trump Administrations, 2018)
10. (Nolette, The Dual Role of State Attorneys General in American Federalism:
Conflict and Cooperation in an Era of Partisan Polarization, 2017)
11. (Schwartz, 1997)
12. Ibid
13. Ibid
14. (William H. Pryor, 2003)
15. (Cohen, 2017)
16. (Platoff, 2018)
17. Ibid
18. (Bennett, 2018)

- 34 19. (Platoff, 2018)
20. (Nolette & Provost, Change and Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys General
in the Obama and Trump Administrations, 2018)
21. Ibid, p. 470
22. Ibid, p.474
23. Ibid
24. (Nolette, The Dual Role of State Attorneys General in American Federalism:
Conflict and Cooperation in an Era of Partisan Polarization, 2017, p. 371)
25. Ibid, p. 370
26. (Bennett, 2018)
27. (Platoff, 2018)
28. (Nolette, The Dual Role of State Attorneys General in American Federalism:
Conflict and Cooperation in an Era of Partisan Polarization, 2017)
29. Ibid, p. 370
30. (Nolette & Provost, Change and Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys General
in the Obama and Trump Administrations, 2018)
31. Ibid, p. 473
32. Ibid
33. (National Association of Attorneys General, 2020)
34. See www.naag.org/news-resources/naag-policy-letters/ for comprehensive
listing.
35. See pp. 6-7
36. (Harvard Law Review, 2014)

- 35 37. Ibid, p. 983
38. (Provost, 2009, p. 601)
39. Ibid, p. 603
40. (Harvard Law Review, 2014, p. 989)
41. Ibid
42. (Provost, 2009, p. 598)
43. (Westwood, 2020) and (Laurel Harbridge, 2011)
44. See https://www.naag.org/news-resources/naag-policy-letters/
45. Significance level: p<0.05
46. (Carlson & Hurd, 2020) outlines predictions for state attorneys general and the
Biden administration

- 36 References
Bennett, J. (2018, November 3). Why State Attorneys General Races Are The Next
Frontier For Out-Of-State Influences. Retrieved from The Center for Public
Integrity: https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/why-state-attorneysgeneral-races-are-the-next-frontier-for-out-of-state-influence/
Carlson, C., & Hurd, W. (2020, November 30). State Attorneys General and the
Upcoming Biden Administration. Retrieved from JD Supra:
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/state-attorneys-general-and-the-87218/
Cohen, R. (2017, March 22). The Hour of the Attorney General. Retrieved from The
American Prospect: https://prospect.org/power/hour-attorneys-general/
Democratic Attorneys General Association. (n.d.). About DAGA. Retrieved from
Democratic Attorneys General Association: https://dems.ag/about/
Harvard Law Review. (2014, Jan 17). Appointing State Attorneys General: Evaluating
the Unbundled State Executive. Harvard Law Review Notes, 127(3).
Laurel Harbridge, N. M. (2011). Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress:
Evidence from Survey Experiments. American Journal of Political Science.
Lipton, E. (2014, October 28). Courting Favor. Retrieved from The New York Times:
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/us/politics/attorneys-general.html
National Association of Attorneys General. (2020). NAAG Policy Letters. Retrieved from
National Association of Attorneys General: https://www.naag.org/newsresources/naag-policy-letters/
National Association of Attorneys General. (2020). What Attorneys General Do.
Retrieved from National Association of Attorneys General:
https://www.naag.org/attorneys-general/what-attorneys-general-do/
Nolette, P. (2017). The Dual Role of State Attorneys General in American Federalism:
Conflict and Cooperation in an Era of Partisan Polarization. Publius: The Journal
of Federalism, 342-377.
Nolette, P., & Provost, C. (2018). Change and Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys
General in the Obama and Trump Administrations. Publius: The Journal of
Federalism, 469-494.
Olson, W. (2017, March 30). Partisan Prosecutions: How State Attorneys General Dove
Into Politics. Retrieved from The New York Post:
https://nypost.com/2017/03/30/partisan-prosecutions-how-state-attorneysgeneral-dove-into-politics/

- 37 Platoff, E. (2018, October 28). Both Republicans and Democrats Have Weaponized
Their AGs. Retrieved from The Atlantic:
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/both-republicans-anddemocrats-have-weaponized-their-ags/574093/
Provost, C. (2009). When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy
Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General. Publius: The Journal of
Federalism, 597-616. Retrieved from Publis.
Republican Attorneys General Association. (n.d.). About RAGA. Retrieved from
Republican Attorneys General Association: https://republicanags.com/about/
Schwartz, J. (1997, May 18). In Tobacco Suits, States Find Strength in Numbers.
Retrieved from The Washington Post:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/05/18/in-tobacco-suitsstates-find-strength-in-numbers/935afbf9-2541-4e65-9229-fb250e9584bb/
Westwood, S. J. (2020). The Partisanship of Bipartisanship: How Representatives Use
Bipartisan Assertions to Cultivate Support. Political Behavior.
William H. Pryor, J. (2003, June 11). Confirmation Hearing On The Nominations Of
William H. Pryor, Jr. To Be Circuit Judge For The Eleventh Circuit And Diane M.
Stuart To Be Director, Violence Against Women Office, Department Of Justice.
S. Hrg. 108-264. (U. S. Committee, Interviewer)

